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MARE CLAUSUM: THE AMERICAN FISHERIES 
PROMOTION ACT OF 1980 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The freedom of the high seas beyond the limits of a coastal 
state's territorial waters has been a recognized right under inter-
national law ever since Hugo Grotius, in the early seventeenth 
century, successfully argued against the Portuguese claim to ex-
clusive use of the South Atlantic and Indian oceans for trade with 
the Indies. 1 The latter part of the twentieth century, however, has 
given rise to increasing claims by coastal states for rights of 
dominion over those waters which, for three and a half centuries, 
were considered beyond the jurisdiction of any sovereignty .1a 
The most recent assertion of such rights by the United States 
is manifested in the American Fisheries Promotion Act of 1980,2 
which seeks to promote and expand United States commercial 
fishing interests by phasing out all foreign fishing within the United 
States 200-mile fishery conservation zone (hereinafter referred to 
as FCZ).2a The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,3 
1. As a young Dutchman in 1604, Grotius became embroiled in the long-drawn con-
flict between the Netherlands and Portugal. For an enlightening discussion of the collapse 
to national claims of dominion over the various oceans, see G. BUTLER & S. MACCOBY, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-60 (1928). For information regarding the life and 
legal works of Grotius, see generally w. KNIGHT, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF HUGO GROTIUS 
1-289 (1925); E. DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND LEGAL WRITINGS OF HUGO GROTIUS 3-178 (1969). 
la. For a thorough-going review of the emergence of various claims to coastal state 
jurisdiction over zones contiguous to the territorial sea, see I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 209-11 (3d ed. 1979). 
2. American Fisheries Promotion Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-561, tit. II, pt. C, 94 
Stat. 3296 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.), signed into law on Dec. 22, 1980 
[hereinafter cited as FP A]. 
2a. The fishery conservation zone (FCZ) was established by the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976): 
There is established a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States to 
be known as the fishery conservation zone. The inner boundary of the fishery con-
servation zone is a line coterminous with the seaward boundary of each of the 
coastal States, and the outer boundary of such zone is a line drawn in such a man-
ner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the ter-
ritorial sea is measured. 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976). · 
3. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 
331 (FCMA) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). See Magnuson, The Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act of 1976: First Step Toward Improved Management of 
Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH . L. REV. 427 (1976); Symposium on the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427 (1976). 
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which established the 200-mile FCZ, is amended by sections 230-38 
of the Fisheries Promotion Act (FP A). This Note will discuss the 
purposes of these sections, characterize their negative effects upon 
United States diplomacy and international commerce, and describe 
how they derogate from the classical freedom of the seas. 
II. BACKGROUND AND NEED 
The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
(MFCMA)4 established the exclusive fishery management authori-
ty of the United States over the following categories: (1) all fish 
within the FCZ5 except tuna; 6 (2) all U .S.-origin anadromous 
species7 throughout their migratory range (except in the zones of 
other states);8 and (3) all fishery resources of the U.S. continental 
shelf beyond the FCZ.9 In asserting this jurisdiction, the United 
States sought to provide for the effective conservation and man-
agement of fish stocks and to assure their development for "the 
greatest overall benefit of the nation." 10 The MFCMA was thus 
designed to provide the economic foundation needed for substan-
tial growth in the U.S. fishing industry .11 
American fishermen, however, failed to achieve any signifi-
cant economic growth or substantial increase in their harvest over 
that of foreign fishermen after the enactment of the MFCMA.12 
American fishermen in 1979 took only fifty-five percent of the 
value of fish landed in the FCZ; an increase of about seven percent 
since the passage of the MFCMA in 1976.13 The continued foreign 
4. Section 238 of the FP A provides that all references to the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976 shall be redesignated as references to the Magnuson Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA). 
5. 16 u.s.c. § 1812(1) (1976). 
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1813 excludes "highly migratory species of fish" from the exclusive 
fishery management authority of the United States. 16 U .S.C. § 1802(14) defines "highly 
migratory species" as species of tuna which, in the course of their life cycle, spawn and 
migrate over great distances in waters of the oceans. 
7. "Anadromous species" means species of fish which spawn in fresh or estuarine 
waters of the United States and which migrate to ocean waters. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(1) (1976). 
8. 16 u.s.c. § 1812(2) (1976). 
9. 16 u.s.c. § 1812(3) (1976). 
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18)(A) (1976). 
11. H.R. REP. No. 1138, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3275 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 HOUSE REPORT]. 
12. Id. at 17. 
13. American Fisheries Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 7039 Before the Subcomm. on 
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domination in the harvesting of underutilized species14 and the 
maintenance of foreign trade barriers blocking the sale of U.S. fish 
in Japanese and other world markets15 were factors which contrib-
uted to the perceived need for the FP A legislation. Considering 
these factors along with the potential benefits of stimulating the 
U.S. fishing industry, Congress reasoned: 
Clearly, the establishment by the FCMA of the 200-mile zone has 
not resulted in the hoped-for rapid expansion of the U.S. fishing 
industry. Full development of U.S. fishery resources by Ameri-
can fishermen and processors would contribute over $1 billion 
per year to the national economy, make the U.S. a net exporter 
of fish products, and lead to the employment of some 43,000 per-
sons.16 
Hence, Congress enacted the FP A in hopes of enabling the fishing in-
dustry to more fully develop U.S. fishery resources.17 
III. PROVISIONS OF THE FPA 
A. Phaseout of Foreign Fishing 
The most controversial feature of the FP A is its mechanism 
for phasing out foreign fishing in the U.S. FCZ within a period of 
five years.18 Under the MFCMA, specific guidelines were estab-
lished to regulate the total allowable level of foreign fishing 
(hereinafter referred to as TALFF) within the U.S. FCZ.19 Each of 
the Regional Fishery Management Councils created by the 
MFCMA 20 determined a T ALFF based upon "that portion of the 
optimum yield of such fishery which will not be harvested by 
vessels of the United States .... "21 "Optimum yield" is defined by 
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the En.vironment of the House Comm. on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 323 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hear-
ings]. 
14. Id. at 42. 
15. Id. at 43. 
16. 1980 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 45. 
17. Id. 
18. FPA § 230, 94 Stat. 3296, amends § 201(d) of the MFCMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) 
(1976). 
19. 16 u.s.c. § 1821 (1976). 
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 establishes eight such regional councils, known as the New Eng-
land, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Caribbean, Gulf, Pacific, North Pacific, and Western 
Pacific Councils. 
21. 16 U .S.C. § 1821(d) (1976) subsequently amended by FP A § 230. 
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the MFCMA 22 in terms of what provides "the greatest overall bene-
fit to the nation" 23 coupled with a prescribed level of fishing based 
on a modification of the maximum sustainable yield24 which takes 
into account "relevant economic, social or ecological factor[s]." 25 If 
United States fishermen were to have the capacity to harvest the 
full optimum yield (OY) in any particular fishery for a given year, 
then foreign fishermen would be excluded from that fishery for 
that year.26 Thus, a mechanism for phasing out foreign fishing 
within the FCZ was already contained in the MFCMA in that 
foreign fishermen would be allowed to harvest only that portion of 
the OY which American fishermen did not.27 The FPA phaseout 
mechanism, however, works by percentages to automatically ex-
clude foreign fishing regardless of whether American fishermen 
harvest a catch equivalent to the OY.28 
Under the FPA, the "phaseout reduction factor amount" for 
any harvesting season after the 1980 harvesting season equals fif-
teen percent of the base harvest for the fishery if U.S. vessels 
harvest seventy-five percent or more of the phaseout reduction 
factor amount determined for the immediately preceding harvest-
ing season.29 If U.S. vessels harvest at least fifty percent but less 
than seventy-five percent of the phaseout reduction factor amount 
for the preceding harvesting season, then the phaseout reduction 
factor amount for the next harvesting season will be an amount 
equal to ten percent of the base harvest.30 If the U.S. vessels 
22. 16 u.s.c. § 1802(18) (1976). 
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18)(A) (1976). 
24. "Maximum sustainable yield" is a theory developed around the turn of the century 
which posits that for each stock of fish there exists a level of fishing at which the maximum 
tonnage of fish can be taken year after year without depleting the stock. Maximum physical 
yield, however, is now taken into consideration along with maximizing net economic 
revenue, maximizing aesthetics, and maximizing total recreational benefits, as complemen-
tary criteria which have welded to reflect the desirability of achieving an "optimum yield" 
from fisheries resources. H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 12-13 to 12-19 (1980 ed.). 
For a complete discussion of purely economic aspects of national fisheries manage-
ment, see Anderson, Criteria for Maximum Economic Yield of an Internationally Exploited 
Fishery, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 159-82 (H. Knight ed. 
1975). 
See notes 73-88 infra and accompanying text. 
25. 16 u.s.c. § 1802(18)(B) (1976). 
26. See 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1976). 
27. Id. 
28. See note 18 supra. 
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(l)(D)(i) (Supp. V 1981). 
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(l)(D)(ii) (Supp. V 1981). 
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harvest at least twenty-five percent but less than fifty percent of 
the phaseout reduction factor amount for the preceding harvest-
ing season, then the phaseout reduction factor amount for the next 
harvesting season will be an amount equal to five percent of the 
base harvest for that fishery. 31 The term "annual fishing level" for 
any fishery after the 1980 harvesting season is the base harvest 
for the fishery involved, reduced by an amount equal to the total 
of the phaseout reduction amounts for that harvesting season and 
for the preceding harvesting seasons.32 
The total allowable level of foreign fishing (T ALFF), if any, 
for each fishery for any harvesting season after 1980 will be the 
lesser of (1) the phaseout fishing level, or (2) the T ALFF as deter-
mined by the appropriate fishery management council.33 As under 
the MFCMA, the Regional Fishery Management Councils deter-
mine the optimum yield for each fishery and the domestic harvest 
which will occur in that fishery .34 Each fishery management council 
determines the T ALFF as the difference, if any, between the do-
mestic harvest and the optimum yield.35 If the former mechanism is 
utilized, it is possible for foreign fishing to be phased out completely 
for a particular fishery despite the fact that a surplus of fish would 
exist.36 
As an example,37 suppose the optimum yield of a fishery is 
100,000 tons and the U.S. capacity is 60,000 tons. Foreign fleets 
would be authorized to take up to 40,000 tons under the old 
MFCMA provision, yet under the FP A, the 1981 allowable foreign 
catch is automatically reduced by fifteen percent of 34,000 tons, 
even if U.S. fishermen could not harvest any of the 6,000 tons 
denied the foreign fishermen. In subsequent years, the allocation 
to foreign fishermen is to be further reduced by fixed percentages 
until no foreign fishing is allowed. Under the phaseout mechanism, 
U.S. fishermen do not have to be capable of harvesting all of the 
amount denied the foreign fishermen before further reductions in 
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(l)(D)(iii) (Supp. V 1981). 
32. 16 U .S.C. § 1821(d)(l)(E) (Supp. V 1981). 
33. MFCMA § 201(d)(2), 16 U.S.C. §1821(d)(l)(E)(2)-(3) (1976). 
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(4) (1976). 
35. 16 u.s.c. § 1821(d) (1976). 
36. See 1980 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 70-71 (dissenting views of Rep. Paul N. 
McCloskey, Jr.). 
37. This is the example of Rep. Paul McCloskey, Jr. in his dissenting views of.the 
FPA. Id. 
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the foreign catch are mandated. If U.S. fishermen can, in the 
future, harvest at least fifty percent of the amount denied foreign 
fishermen in the previous year, all foreign fishing in the FCZ will 
be prohibited by 1990. This would result in leaving substantial re-
sources underutilized in whatever amount between 50 and 100 
percent of the previous year's T ALFF that goes uncaught by U.S. 
fishermen. 38 
B. Linking T ALFF Allocations to Removal of Trade Barriers 
While Congress expected the U.S. fishing industry to expand 
rapidly due to a relatively predictable reduction in the level of 
foreign fishing, it recognized that there would be little incentive 
for such expansion to occur without a substantial increase in the 
market for U.S. fish produce.39 Thus, the FPA requires the Secre-
taries of State and Commerce to consider, inter alia, whether and 
to what extent a foreign state imposes tariff or nontariff barriers 
on the importation, or otherwise restricts the market access of 
United States fish or fishery products when they allocate any 
rights to fish within the U.S. FCZ to that foreign state.4° Conse-
quently, those states desiring access to U.S. fisheries are prompted 
to lower their trade barriers and encourage the purchase of U.S. 
fish, while those nations maintaining trade barriers may have 
their fishing allocations cut or terminated. 
Although the "carrot principle" of using allocations to im-
prove and expand trade seems sensible at first glance, the phase-
out of foreign fishing will seriously jeopardize the United States 
ability to use this approach in the long run. Extending the "carrot 
principle" logic to the likely effect of cuts in foreign allocations 
resulting from the phaseout mechanism, it becorp.es evident that 
American fish export access to those foreign states hurt by the 
phaseout will be restricted. Thus, the linking of T ALFF alloca-
tions with the removal of foreign trade barriers will have the re-
verse effect of that which was intended as the T ALFF is phased 
out.41 
38. Id. 
39. See 1980 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 23; 1980 Hearings, supra note 13, at 82. 
40. FPA § 231, 94 Stat. 3297, amending MFCMA § 201(e)(l), 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(l) 
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
41. See 1980 Hearings, supra note 13, at 82 (statement of Thomas Pickering, Dept. of 
State). 
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C. Foreign Fishing Fee Increases 
The FP A increases the permit fees for allowing foreign 
vessels to fish within the FCZ.42 In determining the permit fees, 
the Secretary of Commerce charges foreign fishermen an amount 
proportional to their share of the volume of the total harvest in 
the FCZ and United States territorial waters.43 This is considered 
equitable since administration, research and enforcement bear a 
reasonable relation to the volume of fish harvested.44 Moreover, 
such fee and cost increases are justified by the consideration that 
American taxpayers should not be required to subsidize foreign 
fishing. 45 The foreign fishing fees should not be regarded as a prac-
tical long-term source of funding, however, because the income 
they provide will eventually diminish as foreign fishing is phased 
out.46 
D. Full Observer Coverage Program 
The primary objective of the MFCMA is the conservation and 
management of fishery resources.47 Toward this end, it is impor-
tant to recognize that enforcement is central to the entire 
fisheries regulation process.48 Prior to enactment of the FPA, the 
overall observer program covered 17.1 percent of foreign fishing 
activity in the Alaskan region, 22.1 percent in the South Atlantic 
42. FPA § 232, 94 Stat. 3298, amends MFCMA § 204(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1824(b)(10) (1976 & 
Supp. V 1981). 
43. If the criterion excluded the harvest in territorial waters, the foreign share of the 
catch and hence the foreign fees would be substantially higher. The foreign catch in 1979 
was 67 percent of the total harvest in the FCZ, but only 39 percent of the total catch in the 
FCZ and the territorial sea combined (foreign fishing is not allowed to any extent within the 
territorial sea, which extends three nautical miles from the coastal baseline). According to 
the new formula, foreign fishermen would have had to pay approximately $63 million in 
1979, instead of $18.5 million they actually paid under the old MFCMA formula. 1980 HousE 
REPORT, supra note 11, at 36. 
44. See id. 
45. Id. 
46. 1980 Hearings, supra note 11, at 52 (statement of Richard Frank, Dept. of Comm.). 
47. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b) & 1851(a)(2) (1976). 
48. For an exhaustive analysis of the role of enforcement, see Goldberg, Ends and 
Means: The Role of Enforcement Analysis in International Fisheries Regulation, in THE 
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 183-211 (H. Knight ed. 1975). Goldberg 
presents the following "table of values" to illustrate the interplay of several elements 
directly relevant to enforcement: 
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and 23.2 percent in the Mid-Atlantic and New England regions. 49 
There were 382 reported violations of the MFCMA in 1979, most 
of these involving "the attempted concealment of total catches by 
erroneous entries into ships' logs."50 
In order to reduce incidental catches of prohibited species and 
ensure the accurate reporting of all foreign catches, the FP A re-
quires that a United States observer be stationed aboard each and 
every foreign fishing vessel within the FCZ and requires the 
foreign vessel to pay an additional surcharge to cover the costs of 
providing the observer.51 The blanket coverage of this provision 
may be waived, however, in situations where a fleet of harvesting 
TABLE OF VALUES 
THE 
WHO GOALS IN ENFORCEMENT DIRECT INDIRECT TYPES OF RESULTS2 
ENFORCES' ENFORCEMENT2 PROCESS3 INFLUENCES3 INFLUENCES3 ACTION2 
Fishery Exclusion of Need for Will to enforce Market Control Unilateral Total exclusion 
Presence, other nations regulation Species deliberate 
Enforcement perceived Area 
ability 
Fishery Presentation of Regulation Cost Research* Bilateral Occasional or 
Presence, stock promulgated Monitoring* Species selective 
No enforce- Arrest**' Other types of Area enforcement 
ment ability Post Trial* Monitoring* 
*No fishery Maximizing share Limits tested Personnel* Technology* Multi-lateral Modest 
presence, Species enforcement 
enforcement Achieving Limits monitored* Equipment* Foreign and/or Area Appearance of 
ability domestic policy enforcement 
No fishery Protection of Reporting* Ability to Status of fishery No enforce-
presence, no unfished fishery withstand ment 
enforcement Apprehension**' collateral attack Effect of national 
ability enforcement 
Other factors Trial* Other L.O.S. 
Issues 
Post trial* 
1. Scaled as to enforcement potential 
2. Scaled as to cost 
3. Cost noted by* 
4. Degree of cost noted by number of* 
Id. at 211. It should be noted that under the FPA, the economic costs of enforcement are 
borne by foreign fishermen. See FPA § 232, 16 U.S.C. § 1824(b)(10) (Supp. V 1981) on Permit 
Fees and FPA § 236, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (Supp. V 1981) on the Full Observer Coverage Pro-
gram. 
49. 1980 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 33-34. 
50. Id. Japan was the leading violator with a total of 147 incidents. Italy was second 
with 87. Id. 
51. FPA § 236, 94 Stat. 3299, amends MFCMA § 201, 16 U.S.C. § 1824(b)(10) (1976 & 
Supp. V 1981). See 1980 Hearings, supra note 13, at 43 (statement of Rep. James Weaver, 
Oregon congressman). 
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vessels transfers its catch to a mother ship that has an observer 
aboard,52 or where the time during which the vessel engages in 
fishing is of such short duration that the placing of an observer 
aboard the vessel would be impractical,53 as in the case of foreign 
longline tuna vessels. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE FREEDOM 
OF FISHING 
A. 200-mile FCZ as Customary International Law 
The MFCMA has been widely criticized as contravening the 
obligations of the United States under the 1958 Convention on the 
High Seas 54 and the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas.55 Article 2 of the High 
Seas Convention56 provides, inter alia, that all nations be allowed 
the "freedom of fishing" and further provides that "no State may 
validly purport to subject any part ... [of the high seas] ... to its 
sovereignty ."57 As has been noted, however, "the acceptance of 
the inevitability of a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone as 
the wave of the future was so general that this unilateral action 
created hardly a ripple, despite the fact that it was in clear viola-
tion of our obligations under the 1958 Convention on the High 
Seas."58 
On May 8, 1970, nine Latin American states signed the 
Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea.59 Those states 
adhering to the Montevideo Declaration asserted dominion over 
52. FPA § 236(i)(2)(A), 94 Stat. 3299 (Supp. V 1981). 
53. FP A § 236(i)(2)(B), 94 Stat. 3299 (Supp. V 1981). 
54. Done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.l.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 
arts. 2, 6, 22 [hereinafter referred to as the High Seas Convention]. 
55. Done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, 
arts. 1, 7, 9-12 [hereinafter referred to as the Fisheries Convention]. See, e.g., Moore, 
Foreign Policy and Fidelity to Law: The Anatomy of a Treaty Violation, 70 A.J.l.L. 802 
(1976). 
Unilateral conservation measures were allowed by the Fisheries Convention only 
when there was "a need for [their] urgent application," and furthermore, they could not 
"discriminate in form or in fact against foreign fishermen." Fisheries Convention, art. 7, 
para. 2. 
56. See note 54 supra. 
57. Id. 
58. Finlay, The Proposed New Convention on the Law of the Sea-A Candid Ap-
praisal, 7 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 135, 139 (1979-80). 
59. I. BROWNLIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 (3rd ed. 1979). The text of the 
Declaration is at 9 l.L.M. 1081-83 (1970), and also 64 A.J.l.L. 1021-23 (1970). 
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the seas to an extent of 200 nautical miles from their respective 
coastlines, involving "sovereignty and jurisdiction to the extent 
necessary to conserve, develop and exploit the natural resources 
of the maritime area adjacent to their coasts, its soil and its sub-
soil," but without prejudice to freedom of navigation and 
overflight.60 By 1978, some seventy-four states had fishing zones of 
200 miles, while ten states had claims greater than 12 but less 
than 200 miles.61 
Senator Warren Magnuson, the principal draftsman of the 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 197662 (MFCMA),63 
has stated that the United States 200-mile claim "played a key role 
in establishing [the 200-mile FCZ as] a customary rule of interna-
tional law in a relatively short period of time."64 Professor 
Brownlie had noted in 1979 that "[c]learly the fishery conservation 
zone, not greater than 200 miles from the usual baselines, is in the 
process of crystallizing as a principle of customary international 
law ."65 Thus, with the widespread acceptance of the 200-mile FCZ 
in state practice and the lack of any modern multilateral Law of 
the Sea treaty to the contrary ,65a 200-mile costal state dominion 
over the sea's resources may correctly be regarded as customary 
international law .66 
B. Freedom of Fishing and Development of the Theory 
of Optimum Utilization 
The fishery resources of the world's oceans have always been 
a vital source of food. The "freedom of fishing" principle, which 
60. BROWNLIE, supra note 59. 
61. Id. at 219. 
62. Supra note 3. 
63. Supra note 4. 
64. Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First Step 
Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 431 (1977). 
65. BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 219. 
65a. On Dec. 10, 1982, after the completion of this Note, the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of Sea Treaty was signed by 119 nations, excluding the United States. 
Article 57 of this Treaty recognizes the right of a coastal state to a 200-mile economic zone. 
Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 
21 l.L.M. 1261. 
66. See Fleischer, The Right to a 200-Mile Exclusive Econamic Zone or a Special 
Fishery Zone, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 548 (1977). Fleischer correctly notes that in the absence 
of applicable international conventions, i.e., treaties (see l.C.J. Stat. art. 38), the most impor-
tant source of international law is custom. Id. at 570. 
A state claiming that a particular practice constitutes customary international law has 
the burden of showing that such practice "is in accordance with a constant and uniform 
usage practiced by the States in question." Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru) 19561.C.J. 266. 
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guaranteed open or unconstrained, nonpriced access to the ocean's 
living resources, is based primarily on the premise that these 
resources are inexhaustible.67 This observation was central to 
Hugo Grotius' writings on the freedom of fishing: "For by using, 
the sea itself is not at all impaired [sic], and it needs no cultivation 
to bear fruit. Therefore, the sea deservedly remained common."68 
For three centuries following the writings of Grotius, open ac-
cess to fisheries remained the prevalent attitude.69 The realization 
that the sea's fishery resources are finite and exploitable beyond 
the point of self-renewal, however, came to pass only within the 
last century .70 Around the turn of the century, the recognition that 
fishery resources were rapidly depleting gave rise to varied 
theories of fisheries management.71 The outcome of both empirical 
and theoretical reasoning evolved into the generalization that for 
each stock of fish there exists a maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 
and an associated level of fishing which will achieve that yield 
year after year without depleting the stock. 72 
1. MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD (MSY) 
Fisheries biologists have determined that the growth pattern 
For a more complete discussion of what constitutes "customary international law" and a 
state's obligation toward it, see generally BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 4-15; G. VON GLAHN, 
LAW AMONG NATIONS 20-24 (4th ed. 1981). 
67. See Prewo, Ocean Fishing: Economic Efficiency and the Law of the Sea, 15 TEX. 
INT'L L.J. 261 (1980). 
68. H. GROTIUS, DEFENSE OF CHAPTER v OF THE MARE LIBERUM, reprint'ed in Wright, 
Some Less Known Works of Hugo Grotius, in 7 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 155-56 (1928) cited 
in Prewo, id. 
69. Prewo, supra note 67, at 262. Prewo remarks that open access was practical not 
because ocean resources were free goods lacking any degree of scarcity, but because the 
benefits to be gained from limiting access and extending jurisdiction over the oceans did not 
justify the costs of establishing and enforcing an exclusive access system. "The situation," 
he notes, "has undergone radical change." Id. 
70. See D. JOHNSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 3 (1965). 
A British Select Committee first fully acknowledged the depletion of fishery 
resources in 1893. The committee blamed declining catches on the destruction of immature 
fish and urged action to prohibit selling fish below specific sizes. Although the committee's 
recommendations went unheeded by Parliament, the committee's position yet illustrates 
the general attitude at the turn of the century: not only were oceanic fisheries exhaustible, 
but they were rapidly being exhausted. Nielsen, The Evolution of Fisheries Management 
Philosophy, [Dec., 1976] MARINE FISHERIES REV. 15-22, reprinted in H. KNIGHT, THE LA w OF 
THE SEA 12-10 (1980 ed.) [hereinafter cited as Nielsen]. 
71. See Nielsen, supra note 70, at 12-10 to 12-19. The finite nature of fisheries 
resources is yet of major concern today, as illustrated by the U.N. Draft Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
72. Id. at 12-12. 
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indicated in Figure I is typical of an emerging fish stock.73 From t
0 
to t 1 , the population increases slowly since there are few fish 
available for reproduction, 
Density of 
stock 
FIGURE 174 
Maximum rate of growth 
(derivative of curve; 
steepest tangent) 
~ r, ~ 
TIME 
but from t
1 
to t
2
, there is a period of rapid growth occasioned by 
the presence of more fish to breed and a lack of pressure on food 
supplies for the fish stock. After t 2 , the growth rate slows because 
of pressure on food supplies. Plotting the rate of change of density 
(dP/dt) against the population (P) yields a curve like that il-
lustrated in Figure 11.75 
~ 
dt 
ho 
(Rate of change 
of population) 
FIGURE 1176 
Maximum Recruitment 
/
(i.e., rate of change of 
population growth) 
Population 
73. H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 660 (1975-76 ed.). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 661. 
76. Id. 
12
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 16
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol9/iss2/16
1982) American Fisheries Promotion Act 415 
Of all the benefits arising from use of the MSY concept,77 
perhaps maximizing the food resource is the most laudable. 
"Either underutilizing or overutilizing a stock of fish wastes food 
which is essential for human welfare."78 Thus, the Fisheries Con-
vention, recognizing that "[c]onservation programmes should be 
formulated with a view to securing in the first place a supply of 
food for human consumption,"79 adopted MSY as the appropriate 
objective of international fisheries management.80 
The MSY concept has been widely-criticized, however, 
because it relies solely on biological criteria and fails to take into 
account the economic, social and political factors also associated 
with fishery management.81 From an economic point of view, MSY 
is considered an inappropriate criterion since it ignores factors 
such as fishing and user cost.82 Economists argue that the intended 
goal of the fishing industry is not to maximize the gross product 
(the MSY), but to maximize the net economic revenue (the profit).83 
The MSY concept is further criticized for not being able to account 
for such important nonbiological factors as sport fishing. 84 Even 
from the biological point of view, the single species ("fish stock") 
concept of MSY fails when the ecological interdependence among 
various fish populations within an ecosystem is considered.85 Such 
interdependence is important to take into account since the ma-
jority of fishing techniques in use today catches more than one 
77. For example, MSY is an objective criterion which avoids "the myriad problems of 
contemporary fishery management, now labeled 'social, economic, and political."' Nielsen, 
supra note 70, at 12-12 to 12-13. 
78. Id. at 12-13. 
79. Fisheries Convention, supra note 55, art. 2. 
80. Although the wording of the Convention states "optimum," the intent is max-
imum. Nielsen, supra note 70, at 12-13. 
81. H. KNIGHT, MANAGING THE SEAS RESOURCES 6 (1977). 
82. Peterson & Fisher, The Exploitation of Extractive Resources: A Survey, 87 
ECON. J. 681, 688 (1977). Various studies of individual fisheries have demonstrated the ex-
tent of possible economic waste. In the Pacific salmon fishery (which uses the MSY), for ex-
ample, it was estimated that the same annual yield and total revenue could be obtained with 
a fifty million dollar reduction in labor and capital investment. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. 
PONTECORVO, THE PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES: A STUDY OF IRRATIONAL CONSERVATION 174 
(1969). 
83. Nielsen, supra note 70, at 12-14. 
84. Id. at 12-13. Nielsen notes that "[t]he importance of sport fishing for psychological 
well-being has been likened to that of the finer arts .... Sport fishing is regarded ... as a 
more desirable allocation of resources than commercial fishing because the recreational 
benefit extends to more people." Id. at 12-13 to 12-14. 
85. Id. at 12-15. 
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species of fish at a time.86 In addition, the influence of politics in 
fisheries management, even though excluded from determining 
the MSY, has always existed.87 Demands of domestic fishing in-
terests for preferential treatment over foreign fleets are perhaps 
foremost among political considerations, and certainly seem to 
have provided the necessary impetus for passage of the FP A in 
late 1980.88 
2. OPTIMUM YIELD (OY) 
The existence of the aforementioned criteria eventually gave 
rise to a theory which posited that the only realistic objective of a 
conservation program was to achieve "a state of optimum 
fishing." 89 Despite the status of MSY in international law, binding 
upon those parties to the Fisheries Convention,90 the International 
Court of Justice has recognized the optimum yield (OY) concept in-
sofar as allowing domestic coastal fishermen preferential rights in 
exploitation of fisheries. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case 
(United Kingdom v. Iceland),91 the International Court held that 
the concept of preferential rights had crystallized as customary in-
ternational law .92 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea93 
86. Thus, incidental catches of species by fisheries aimed at other species may 
substantially alter the intended total catch. Id. 
87. Nielsen, supra note 70, at 12-16 provides some examples where biologically-based 
recommendations have succumbed to contemporary political problems. 
88. See 1980 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 68 (dissenting views of Rep. Paul N. Mc-
Closkey, Jr.). McCloskey remarks that the FP A "is essentially a collection of goodies for the 
U.S. commercial fishing industry, artfully drafted to appeal to fishing interests in enough 
coastal states to assure passage by a committee which primarily consists of representatives 
of those states." Id. 
89. H. KNIGHT, MANAGING THE SEAS RESOURCES 8 (1977). For a complete discussion of 
the development of fisheries management theories, see Nielsen, supra note 70. 
90. A state's obligation under such treaties is pacta sunt servanda, meaning simply 
that a state must carry out its treaty obligations in good faith. See Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 63 A.J.I.L. 
875-84 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 
138 (1965). 
91. 1974 I.C.J. 3. 
92. More specifically, the Court recognized "preferential rights of fishing in adjacent 
waters in favour of the coastal state in a situation of special dependence on its coastal 
fisheries, this preference operating in regard to other states concerned in the exploitation 
of the same fisheries." 1974 I.C.J. at 23, 24-31(emphasis added). 
93. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Draft Convention (Infor-
mal Text), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3 of Aug. 27, 1980, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1129 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as U .N. Draft Convention]. See note 65a supra. 
14
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 16
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol9/iss2/16
1982] American Fisheries Promotion Act 417 
(UNCLOS III) also adheres to the OY concept, conditioning access 
to a coastal state's FCZ94 upon the economic and other interests of 
the coastal state.95 Article 61 of the U .N. Draft Convention pro-
vides that "the coastal State shall establish conservation and 
management measures to prevent overfishing and to maintain or 
restore populations of harvested species at levels which can pro-
duce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant en-
vironmental and economic factors .... "96 The Draft Convention, 
however, provides that economic factors include "the economic 
needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements 
of developing States."97 
Article 62, paragraph 1, of the U.N. Draft Convention states 
that "[t]he coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum 
utilization of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone 
without prejudice to Article 61. ... "98 Stressing the economic 
determinations of the coastal state as a controlling factor, article 
62, paragraph 3 is also relevant: 
In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone 
under this article, the coastal State shall take into account all 
relevant factors, including, inter alia, the significance of the liv-
ing resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State con-
cerned and its other national interests, ... the requirements of 
developing States in the subregion or region in harvesting part 
of the surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation in 
States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone .... 99 
The MFCMA also recognizes attainment of the OY as a 
primary objective in its fishery management program.100 Optimum 
yield, as used in the MFCMA, is vaguely defined in terms of what 
provides "the greatest overall benefit to the nation"101 along with a 
prescribed level of fishing based on a modification of the MSY 
which takes into account "relevant economic, social or ecological 
94. For the purposes of fisheries, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) is the functional equivalent 
of the 200-mile FCZ. 
95. Articles 61 and 62 of the Draft Convention, supra note 93, deal with the conserva-
tion and utilization of the living resources of the 200-mile zone. 
96. Id. art. 61, para. 3 (emphasis added). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. art. 62, para. 1. 
99. Id. art. 62, para. 3 (emphasis added). 
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 180l(b)(4) (1976). 
101. 16 U .S.C. § 1802(18)(A) (1976). 
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factor[s]." 102 Under the MFCMA, the total allowable level of for-
eign fishing (T ALFF) is then allocated on the basis of granting 
American fishermen preferential interest by allowing foreign fish-
ermen to take only that portion of the OY left unharvested by U.S. 
fleets. 103 As previously noted,104 the FPA further modifies the 
T ALFF determination by employment of the phaseout mecha-
nism.105 Hence, under the FPA, the OY of a particular fishery may 
be left unharvested even though foreign fishermen are precluded 
from that fishery .106 
The FP A House Report concludes from the provisions of the 
U.N. Draft Convention 107 that "optimum utilization," as sanctioned 
by international state practice, is conditioned on the economic in-
terests of the coastal state and, therefore, is an objective and not 
an obligation.108 
Thus, under the [U .N. Draft Convention], there is no absolute 
right of foreign States to the surplus of fish in the 200-mile 
zones. There is merely a conditional privilege. The duty of the 
coastal State ... is "to promote the objective" of optimum utiliza-
tion, but clearly, this duty is qualified. As the plain meaning of 
the text establishes, optimum utilization in no way prejudices 
the economic and other interests of the nation.109 
Citing the $2.7 billion U.S. balance of trade deficit in fisheries prod-
ucts in 1979 and other economic hardships being faced by the U.S. 
fishing industry, the FPA House Report states that "[t]hese are 
extremely important economic realities that, by themselves, far 
outweigh whatever might arguably be lost to foreign fishermen as 
U.S. fishermen grew into the surplus."110 Thus, it is appropriately 
argued that the FP A phaseout mechanism is consistent with inter-
national law as worded in the U.N. Draft Convention in that eco-
nomic interests are an appropriate consideration in allocating 
foreign access to the FCZ. 111 
102. 16 u .s.c. § 1802(18)(B) (1976). 
103. 16 u .s.c. § 1821(d) (1976). 
104. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text. 
105. See note 18 supra. 
106. See notes 28, 36 supra. 
107. See notes 94-99 supra and accompanying text. 
108. 1980 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24. 
109. Id. at 26. 
110. Id. 
111. Although the U .N. Draft Convention does not achieve the status of international 
law until it is ratified by at least 60 nations, the overwhelming support for the optimum 
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C. Sanctioned Economic Discrimination and Protectionism 
The foreign fishing phaseout mechanism, 112 the increase in 
foreign fishing permit fees, 113 and the observer coverage sur-
charges114 of the FP A all serve to place substantial restrictions on 
foreign access to renewable fishery resources within the U.S. 
FCZ, regardless of the harvesting capabilities of the U.S. fishing 
industry.115 While other coastal states also adhere to the OY con-
cept of fisheries management, they generally also recognize an 
obligation to make available to fishermen of other countries that 
portion of the total allowable catch which exceeds their own na-
tional harvesting capabilities.116 The American Fisheries Promo-
tion Act of 1980, however, by implementing higher economic 
rents 117 and the phaseout mechanism, goes beyond the MFCMA 
and the unilateral actions of other nations in derogating from the 
classical freedom of the seas. 
While the U .N. Draft Convention does not sanction a man-
datory phaseout of foreign fishing within a coastal state's FCZ, it 
does sanction protective and discriminatory practices in fisheries 
management. The nationalistic fishery conservation guidelines en-
dorsed by the U .N. Draft Convention and the MFCMA along with 
the FPA are vague and conflicting, containing references to 
biological, ecological, and economic factors. 118 Although the use of 
the MSY concept is approved, "[n]onadherence to the concept can 
be justified by relevant environmental and economic factors. The 
intermingling of these vague and potentially conflicting criteria ... 
justifies politically motivated fishery management, while paying 
lip service to scientific conservation criteria." 119 Thus, the broad 
discretion which is accorded the United States by the provisions 
of the FP A, and endorsed by the U .N. Draft Convention, serves to 
yield provisions indicates that they may be regarded as customary international law as 
evidenced by widespread acceptance and use in state practice. See note 66 supra. 
112. See note 18 supra. 
113. See notes 42-43 supra. 
114. See note 51 supra. 
115. See notes 28, 36 supra. 
116. See Moore, National Legislation for the Management of Fisheries Under Extend-
ed Coastal State Jurisdiction, 11 J. MAR. L. & COM. 157-63 (1980). 
117. I.e., increased permit fees and observer coverage surcharges, supra notes 42-43, 
51. 
118. See notes 95-99, 101-02, 108 supra. 
119. Prewo, supra note 67, at 278. 
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sanction protective and discriminatory practices.120 The FPA goes 
beyond the "discretionary" protectionism of the U .N. Draft Con-
vention, however, in that the phaseout of foreign fishing is man-
datory .121 Thus, under the FPA, the MSY criterion not only can be, 
but is subordinated to national economic interests. 
V. INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS 
A. States with Historic Rights 
Among the states affected by the FPA's protectionist 
phaseout of foreign fishing are those which have traditionally fish-
ed in American coastal waters. 121a The FP A phaseout fails to con-
sider "the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose 
nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made 
substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks." 122 
Japan is the most prominent example of a nation that will suffer 
serious adverse effects from the implementation of the FPA.123 
The Japanese have both "habitually fished" in the U.S. FCZ 124 and 
"have made substantial efforts in research and identification of 
stocks."125 The Japanese have been operating within a decreased 
sphere of ocean space ever since the promulgation and acceptance 
of the 200-mile fishery zone in international law, 126 and the 
phaseout of foreign fishing within the FCZ will drastically affect 
120. Prewo remarks that, under the U.N. Draft Convention, 
[s]ince the determination of both variables (total allowable catch and capacity) is at 
the discretion of the coastal state, it is possible not only to discriminate against 
foreign fishermen, but to exclude them entirely simply by defining domestic 
capacity at or above total allowable catch. . . . Discrimination among foreign 
fishermen on the basis of nationality is explicitly approved. 
Id. at 278-79. The FPA, by adding the phaseout mechanism as a factor other than total 
allowable catch (or OY), is simply making the discrimination mandatory. 
121. See notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text. 
121a. For a discussion of those situations in which foreign fishermen have "acquired 
rights" in an overseas fishery, see Goldie, The Oceans' Resources and International 
Law-Possible Developments In Regional Fisheries Management, 8 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 25-28 (1969). 
122. U.N. Draft Convention, supra note 93, art. 63, para. 2. The MFCMA also provides 
that special consideration must be granted such states. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(l) (1976). 
123. For an excellent and thorough discussion of the Japanese fishing industry and its 
interests in American fisheries, see Jones, Freedom of Fishing in Decline: The Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 and Implications for Japan, 11 CALIF. W. INT'L 
L.J. 52 (1981). 
124. Conflicts over fishery relations between the United States and Japan began in 
1936. Id. at 93, n. 201. 
125. See id. 
126. Id. at 101. 
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the Japanese fishing industry .121 The displacement of the Japanese 
fishing industry is contrary to provisions of both the MFCMA 128 
and the U.N. Draft Convention,129 and undoubtedly has negative 
consequences with regard to U.S.-Japanese foreign relations.130 
Generally speaking, the FPA contravenes widely-accepted 
goals of international trade. The coercive measure of linking 
foreign access to the FCZ to each foreign state's removal of trade 
barriers on U.S. fish produce may effect a reciprocal increase of 
trade barriers as it excludes more and more nations from the FCZ 
under the phaseout mechanism.131 The exclusion and economic 
displacement of foreign nations from access to U.S. fisheries, and 
the disregard of the needs of developing nations, along with the 
general protectionist policy of the FP A, all serve to contravene 
the two basic goals for world commerce established at the most re-
cent round of international trade negotiations:132 first, to expand 
and liberalize world trade and, second, to improve the trading 
strength of the developing countries.133 The FPA thus contravenes 
principles of international law and commerce in attempting to pro-
mote the development of the U.S. fishing industry through 
unilateral action. 
B. Developing States 
Developing states are also adversely affected by the protec-
tionism of the FP A, as it fails to accord them any special con-
sideration in allowing foreign access to the FCZ.134 Moreover, 
subordination of the MSY principle of fisheries management to 
United States national economic considerations 135 results in "a 
clear waste of [fishery] resource[s] and . is particularly 
egregious in light of world requirements for protein. In 1979, 
127. See generally id. 
128. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821(e)(l)-(2) (1976). 
129. U.N. Draft Convention, supra note 93, art. 63. 
130. See 1980 Hearings, supra note 13, at 310-13. 
131. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
132. The Tokyo Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotia-
tions. 
133. Declaration of Ministers Approved at Tokyo on Sept. 14, 1973, para. 1, reprinted 
in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 
(20th Supp.) 19 (1974). 
134. Art. 63, para. 2 of the U .N. Draft Convention, supra note 93, provides that 
developing states in the subregion or region of the coastal state are to be accorded special 
consideration in being granted access to the coastal state's FCZ. 
135. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text. 
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800,000 tons of fish were available but not harvested in the U.S. 
zone. This is enough protein to feed four million people for an en-
tire year." 136 The disregard of developing states' needs for both ex-
panded coastal fisheries 137 and food resources thus only serves to 
occasion further international criticism of U.S. policy toward the 
Third World.138 
C. Trade Relations and Commerce 
The reactions of foreign governments to the enactment of the 
FP A have been negative. Mexico repudiated all bilateral fishing 
agreements with the United States only one week after the FP A 
was signed.139 Japan immediately withdrew proposals for joint 
ventures with the United States upon hearing of the impending 
passage of the FP A.140 
These reactions well-illustrate the adverse impact the FP A 
has on U.S. trade relations. While Mexico has stated that it would 
be willing to negotiate a new fishing agreement that would be 
"fair and equitable" to both countries, 141 such an agreement is 
unlikely to be reached considering that the phaseout mechanism of 
the FP A precludes U.S. negotiators from offering Mexico any 
long-term access to the U.S. FCZ. Hence the FPA has resulted in 
withdrawing one of the United States "best bargaining chips" 
from the negotiating table.142 
This loss of negotiating power, in addition to the precedent 
the FP A sets for other countries, acts to impede U.S. access to 
foreign fisheries. Within two years after passage of the MFCMA, 
136. 1980 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 71, n. 1. 
137. As . . . developing countries develop coastal fisheries, they trend almost 
at once into becoming longer and longer range fishermen as well, fishing off the 
coasts of other countries as a part of their necessary fishery economies just about 
as naturally and necessarily as the fish migrate for biological necessity .... 
Chapman, Fishery Resources in Offshore Waters, in THE LAW OF THE SEA 92-93 (L. Alex-
ander ed. 1977). 
138. United States aid to developing states stands at just 0.27 percent of the Gross Na-
tional Product. This percentage of aid is considered quite low among industrialized states, 
and a large part of it goes to Israel and Egypt. The Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1981, at A20, 
col. 3. 
139. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1980, at Al, col. 3. 
140. 1980 Hearings, supra note 13, at 316. "The confusion and dismay it provoked in 
Japan cannot be described." Id. at 310 (statement of Alan Macnow, Tele-Press Associates, 
Inc.). 
141. N.Y. Times, supra note 139. 
142. 1980 Hearings, supra note 13, at 81 (statement of Thomas Pickering, Dept. of 
State). 
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eighty-six other countries followed the lead of the United States 
and claimed jurisdiction to living resources within 200 miles of 
their coasts.143 If other countries implement phaseout legislation 
like they implemented 200-mile jurisdictional zones, the U.S. tuna 
industry will seriously suffer the consequences. The U.S. tuna 
fleet in 1979 caught $20.6 million worth of tuna inside the U.S. 
FCZ, while landing $134.1 million within the 200-mile zones of 
other countries.144 The tuna industry accounts for twenty-one per-
cent of U.S. food finfish earnings, thousands of jobs in the process-
ing sector, and twenty-five percent of the fish consumed in the 
United States.145 Thus, the FPA sets a dangerous precedent for 
other countries to follow, making the phaseout of the U.S. tuna in-
dustry from foreign fisheries a woeful possibility. 
The harm inflicted upon foreign trade relations by the FP A is 
likely to prove counterproductive to the goals established for the 
FP A even if other countries do not resort to phasing out U.S. 
fishing in their fishery conservation zones. Prior to the introduc-
tion of the FP A in the House of Representatives, a joint venture 
with Japan was in the offing that would supposedly aid the 
development of U.S. harvesting of underutilized species as well as 
improve the Japanese market for such U .S.-caught fish. 146 The 
resentment provoked by the FPA, however, brought an end to 
these plans.147 
The phaseout mechanism, while designed to allow the U.S. 
fishing industry to expand into such areas as the harvesting of 
low-value, underutilized species which are dominated by foreign 
fleets, actually does nothing to improve the ability of U.S. 
fishermen to catch the 1.6 million metric tons of low-value fish 
harvested by foreign vessels in 1979.148 It also does nothing to im-
prove the U.S. ability to deliver a product that meets the higher 
143. 1980 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 71. 
144. 1980 Hearings, supra note 13, at 263 (statement of David G. Burney, U.S. Tuna 
Foundation). 
145. Id. at 310. 
146. This program included the technical assistance of the Japanese in building a 
surimi processing plant in Alaska, promulgation of Japanese fish product standards in the 
U.S., the formation of a market development task force composed of Japanese and 
American industry leaders, technical assistance to U.S. fish processors and fishermen, a 
joint venture with Alaskan fishermen, test marketing and U.S. product promotion activities 
in Japan. Id. at 316 (statement of Alan Macnow, Tele-Press Associates, Inc.). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 314. 
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quality standards of foreign markets.149 An analysis by the In-
stitute of Social and Economic Research of the University of 
Alaska concluded that development of the bottom fish industry in 
Alaska is likely to take at least ten to fifteen years. 150 Thus, it is 
doubtful that the FP A will be very effective in expanding the U.S. 
fishing industry into low-value species harvesting.151 
Regardless of the technological capabilities of the U.S. fishing 
industry, however, an expanded overseas market for U .S.-caught 
fish is the determinative factor in any formula to promote the U.S. 
fishing industry .152 As previously discussed, 153 the phaseout is in-
consistent with linking TALFF allocations to gain foreign market 
access. Moreover, the diminishing allocations under the phaseout 
schedule may well spur retribution by foreign markets. 154 The clos-
ing off of U.S. fisheries to foreign fleets also encourages the 
development of substitute fisheries, thereby increasing competi-
tion on the world market for fish caught within the U.S. FCZ.155 
Without a market for the anticipated increase in U .S.-caught fish, 
any increased harvesting capacity of U.S. vessels will prove 
valueless. Because the FP A fails to make proper overtures to 
foreign countries in order to effect a lowering of their trade bar-
riers, its objectives appear to be bound for failure. 
' VI. MARE LIBERUM VIS A VIS MARE CLAUSUM 
Why do you deny me water? Its use is free to all. Nature has 
made neither sun nor air nor waves private property; they are 
public gifts.156 
Freedom of fishing beyond the limits of the territorial sea has 
been a high seas freedom ever since the time Hugo Grotius' theory 
of mare liberum 157 first gained ascendancy over John Selden's 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. See id. at 264-65 (statement of David G. Burney, U.S. Tuna Foundation). 
153. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text. 
154. See 1980 Hearings, supra note 13, at 309 (statement of Alan Macnow). 
155. "We have to look at this as a two-sided venture. In international affairs, the 
reciprocity very often applies." 1980 Hearings, supra note 13, at 87 (statement of Thomas 
Pickering, Dept. of State). 
156. Ovid, cited in H. Grotius, Mare Liberum (Magoffin trans. 1916), reprinted in H. 
KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 2-19 (1980 ed.). 
157. "MARE LIBERUM. The sea free. The title of a work written by Grotius against 
the Portuguese claim to an exclusive trade to the Indies, through the South Atlantic and In-
dian oceans; showing that the sea was not capable of private dominion. 1 Kent, Comm. 27." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (4th ed. 1951). 
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theory of mare clausum.158 Grotius and those writers following him 
adduced two facts as the principal reasons for the freedom the 
seas: (1) no part of the open sea could be effectively occupied by 
a navy, and could not therefore be actually controlled by any state, 
and (2) nature does not give anyone the right to appropriate that 
which is inexhaustible and may inoffensively be used by 
everybody .159 Although both of these factors are now without foun-
dation, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht remarks that "[t]he real reason for 
the freedom of the open sea is represented in the motive which led 
to the attack against maritime sovereignty . . . - namely, the 
freedom of communication, and especially commerce, between the 
States which are separated by the sea." 160 
The modern practice of states exhibits a trend away from the 
classical mare liberum. As the 200-mile FCZ is increasingly ac-
cepted as customary international law,161 the United States ap-
pears far from being alone in asserting jurisdiction over the high 
seas. 
A phenomenon of our own times is that, after more than three 
centuries of mare liberum, we are now seeing the emergence of a 
new species of mare clausum, not merely through uninhibited na-
tional claims as put forward in international arenas like the 
United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences, but also through 
concrete state practice as asserted in unilateral state actions 
trenching upon the classical freedom of the seas and the free 
availability of its resources to all comers.162 
In both promulgating the 200-mile FCZ as customary international 
law 163 and being the first state to mandatorily phase out all foreign 
fishing within a conservation zone, the United States appears in 
the forefront of an international tendency toward a "new" mare 
clausum. 
158. "MARE CLAUSUM. The sea closed; that is, not open or free. The title of Selden's 
great work, intended as an answer to the Mare Liberum of Grotius; in which he undertakes 
to prove the sea to be capable of private dominion. 1 Kent, Comm. 27." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 119 (4th ed. 1951). See A. Sw ARTZTRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL 
SEAS 18-22 (1972). 
159. L. OPPENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL LAW-A TREATISE 593 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 
1955). 
160. Id. at 593-94. 
161. See notes 58-66 supra and accompanying text. 
162. McWhinney, The Codifying Conference as an Instrument of International Law-
Making: From the "Old" Law of the Sea to the "New," 3 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 301, 307 
(1975). 
163. See note 64 supra. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The American Fisheries Promotion Act of 1980 is unlikely to 
be successful in promoting the U.S. fishing industry because such 
promotion is too dependent upon that world market against which 
it discriminates.164 While the MFCMA of 1976 recognized that 
domestic fishermen were to have preference over foreign 
fishermen in harvesting the optimum yield of a fishery, 165 the FPA 
makes it possible for foreign fishermen to be phased out complete-
ly despite the fact that a surplus of fish exists.166 Thus, on its face, 
the FP A is contrary to the Fisheries Convention in failing to serve 
to secure a supply of food for human consumption.167 Moreover, the 
FP A patently subordinates such humanitarian concerns to na-
tional economic interests.168 The United States economic protec-
tionism in fishery resources has received a cold reception abroad 
and seems unlikely to succeed in opening up foreign markets to 
U.S. fish produce. Regardless of its immediate effects upon trade 
and commerce, however, the American Fisheries Promotion Act 
serves to promulgate a new mare clausum in international prac-
tice through unilateral action. 
Stephen C. Stanley 
164. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text. See also note 155 supra. 
165. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. 
166. See notes 28, 36 supra and accompanying text. 
167. See note 79 supra and accompanying text. 
168. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text. 
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